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et al.: Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York: Conflict and Conf

MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
IN NEW YORK: CONFLICT AND
CONFUSION
Traditionally, the period within which medical malpractice
actions had to be commenced was computed from the time of the
negligent act. In 1962 and 1969, the New York State Court of Appeals added new rules to avoid the harsh results of a strict application of that "time of the act" standard. These "continuous
treatment" and "foreign object discovery" rules were adopted to give
the plaintiff more time to discover that he had been treated negligently and, thus, to commence his action.
The traditional time of the act rule was court-made. In the absence of restrictive legislative mandates, the Court of Appeals plainly
had the power to change it. However, when the court added the continuous treatment rule in 1962, it clung to the language and concepts
of the time of the act rule. This combination of modern theory and
old language created new problems. Furthermore, although the court
clearly broke with the past when it adopted the foreign object discovery rule in 1969, this rule was both contrary to existing statutes
and unnecessarily restricted to foreign objects.
This comment will consider the policy behind the adoption of
these new rules, their inherent theoretical failings and their subsequent application by the lower courts.
I. BACKGROUND
In New York, an action to recover damages for medical malpractice must be commenced within three years' after the cause of action accrues.2 Determining when a cause of action accrues, however,
has caused much difficulty. Many courts have stated the proposition
that a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff may first maintain an
action. 8 This is mere tautology because it does not tell a particular
plaintiff when he may first go into court to make his demand for
relief. Consequently, most courts have traditionally applied a more
precise test.
Professor Lillich has summarized this tests as follows: "the New
1. N.Y. Crmu PRACTIcE LAW AND Ru.Es § 214(6) (McKinney 1972) [hereinafter CPLR].
2. CPLR § 203(a) (McKinney 1962).
3.See Low v. State, 202 Misc. 455, 465, 112 N.Y.S.2d 297, 308 (N.Y. Ct. C1. 1952),
rev'd, on other grounds, 281 App. Div. 809, 120 N.Y.S.2d 339 (3d Dep't. 1953), aff'd,
305 N.Y. 913, 114 N.E.2d 470 (1953); and Ryan Ready Mixed Concrete v. Coons, 25
App. Div. 2d 530, 267 N.Y.S.2d 627, 630 (2d Dept. 1966).
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York courts have consistently held that the action accrues at the time
of the acts of the physician which constitute the malpractice." 4 His
conclusion is theoretically incorrect: the Court of Appeals has subsequently explained that the traditional rule in New York has been
that the cause of action accrues when the act first produces injury.5
In practice, however, most courts have held that the first injury,
though often imperceptible, is produced at the time of the act, and
thus it can be said that the cause of action does generally accrue at
the time of the act.
The physician-patient relationship is one of unilateral trust; the
patient is generally ignorant of the particulars of his ailment and the
proper course of treatment. Blind reliance on the doctor's advice
often precludes the patient's quick determination that he has been
negligently injured. Further, the difficulty of discovering malpractice in many cases is compounded by the internal and invisible nature of the injury. Under a strict application of the time of the act
rule, therefore, a plaintiff may not have knowledge of his cause of
action until long after it has accrued; the statute of limitations would
be running from the time of the act. If the patient could not discover the malpractice within three years, he would be permanently
barred from maintaining an action. Thus, while providing a practical standard for determining the moment of accrual, the strict application of the time of the act rule led to injustice for plaintiffs.
4. R. Lillich, The Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York and Other Ju-

risdictions,47 CORNELL L.Q. 839, 340 (1962).
5. The opinion of Judge Lehman [in Schmidt v. Merchants Desp. Transp. Co.,
270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936)] recognizes the classic principle that "'in actions of negligence damage is of the very gist and essence of the plaintiff's
cause. (Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 235.)" The opinion goes on to say:
"Through lack of care a person may set in motion forces which touch the person or property of another only after a long interval of time (Cf. Ehret v. Village of Scarsdale, 269 N.Y. 198); and then only through new, fortuitous
conditions. There can be no doubt that a cause of action accrues only when
the forces wrongfully put in motion produce injury..
All of the text writers
and relevant cases so hold.... [The opinion notes 1 CoonEY, ToRrs (4th ed.),

§46].
... They would indicate, however, that the action accrues only when there
is some actual deterioration of the plaintiff's bodily structure....

Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y2d 212, 216-17, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714,
717 (1963).
6. Conklin v. Draper, 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N.Y.S. 529 (1st Dept. 1930), aff'd
mem., 254 N.Y. 620, 173 N.. 892 (1930); Schmidt v. Merchants Desp. Transp. Co.,
270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (196).
"Judge Lehman's view in the Schmidt case is right as we must assume that the
dust immediately acted upon Schmidt's lung tissue" (Schmidt was an action against a
former employer to recover for pneumoconiosis, caused by inhalation of dust negligently allowed to accumulate in the air.) Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp.,
12 N.Y2d 212, 217, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, 717 (1963). Cf. Lillich, supra note 4, at 340-343.
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In light of this problem, the Court of Appeals took two steps to
give plaintiff more time to discover the existence of his cause of action by adopting the continuous treatment and foreign object discovery rules.
II. THE

CONTINUOUS TREATMENT RULE

The first case in which the continuous treatment rule was applied was Gillette v. Tucker,7 decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio
in 1902. The defendant physician left a cheesecloth sponge in the
plaintiff patient's abdomen during an appendectomy. The plaintiff
continued under the defendant's care for one year following surgery, during which time she complained to the physician that the
incision was not healing properly. Eight months after the doctor
had discharged her from his care, she discovered the cause of her
discomfort. Her action should have been barred by the one year
Ohio statute of limitations. If the traditional rule were applied, the
limitations period would have begun to run at the time the sponge
was left inside her. To allow her to maintain her action, however,

the court formulated the continuous treatment rule,8 holding that
her cause of action did not accrue until the termination of the physician-patient relationship.
In reaching this result, the Ohio Supreme Court declared that
the plaintiff's inability to discover the cause of her injury was irrelevant. 9 While taking this position, the court implicitly acknowledged
the difficulty a patient would encounter in discovering the source of
an injury while still under treatment by her doctor:
Indeed, it would be inconsistent to say, that the plaintiff
might sue for her injuries while the surgeon was still in
charge of the case and advising and assuring her that proper
patience would witness a complete recovery. It would be trifling with the law and the courts to exact compliance with
such a rule, in order to have a standing in court for the vindication of her rights. It would impose upon her an improper
burden to hold, that in order to prevent the statute from running against her right of action, she must sue while she was

7. 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902).
8. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant on the ground that the plaintiffs case was barred by the statute of limitations. The circuit court reversed. The
Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the circuit court opinion in what is acknowledged
to be the first reported continuous treatment decision.
9. "[1It is wholly immaterial whether the patient knew of the true source of her
trouble or not." 67 Ohio St. at 127, 65 NE. at 870.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1973

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1973], Art. 17

Comments
following the advice of the surgeon and upon which she all
the time relied.' 0
In justifying the new rule, the court joined these policy considerations with traditional accrual concepts. First, it viewed the case
as a tort action founded upon breach of a continuing contractual
duty to exercise a proper degree of skill, care, and diligence during
surgery and "in the subsequent necessary treatment following such
operation.... ."I' So long as the physician-patient relationship subsisted, a continuous obligation rested upon the doctor to remove the
sponge; failure to do so gave rise to a single cause of action accruing
at the time the doctor abandoned the case.
The court's second justification for the continuous treatment rule
was its theory that damages had accrued to the plaintiff throughout
the entire period the physician was in charge of the case. Injury is
the heart of a tort action. "[H]er cause of action accrues when her
injuries occurred; and if these injuries blended and extended during the entire period the surgeon was in charge of the case, her right
of action became complete when the surgeon gave up the case without performing his duty."' 2
Thus, in a case involving both a continuous obligation and the
progressive accrual of damages, the cause of action does not accrue,
and the statute of limitations will not run, until the termination
of the physician-patient relationship.
The first application of the continuous treatment rule by the
New York Court of Appeals occurred in 1962 in Borgia v. City of
New York.' 3 The infant plaintiff was admitted to the defendant hospital for treatment for burns. Shortly thereafter, he lapsed into "irreversible shock" because of the hospital's improper care. On three
later occasions inattentive care caused the infant to convulse. The
burns healed, but as a result of the malpractice the plaintiff suffered
permanent brain damage despite subsequent corrective efforts by the
hospital, including physiotherapy and rehabilitation.
A notice of claim was required as a condition precedent to commencement of the action because the defendant was a municipal
10. Id. at 129, 65 N.E. at 871.
11. Id. at 122, 65 N.E. at 869.
12. Id. at 129, 65 N.E. at 871.
13. 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1962). The continuous treatment rule was first applied in New York in Sly v. Van Lengen, 120 Misc. 420, 198
N.Y.S. 608 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1923). As in Gillette, the doctor in Sly failed
to remove sponges from the patient's body during surgery. The court held that "the
limitation did not begin to run against plaintiff's right to maintain the action until
the case had been abandoned by the defendant, or the professional relationship terminated." Id. at 422, 198 N.Y.S. at 610.
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corporation. Section 50-e of the General Municipal Law requires that
the notice of claim must be filed within ninety days after the claim
arises. The notice was served within ninety days after discharge, but
some four and a half months after the last act of malpractice. 14
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's claim was timely
filed. 5 The Appellate Division, holding that the claim arose upon
the last act of malpractice, reversed.'" The Court of Appeals expressly
rejected this "last act of malpractice" test, affirming the Supreme
Court. It held that "at least when the course of treatment which
includes the wrongful acts or omissions has run continuously and is
related to the same original condition or complaint, the 'accrual'
comes only at the end of treatment."' 7
As in Gillette, policy was a major factor in the Borgia decision.' 8
It would be absurd to require a wronged patient to interrupt
corrective efforts by serving a summons on the physician or
hospital superintendent or by filing a notice of claim in the
case of a city hospital.... Acceptance by us of the city's argument that the 90 days ran from the last malpractice would
mean that, if the child had remained in the hospital a few
days longer than he did, the 90-day period would have expired
while he was still a patient receiving care and treatment related to the conditions produced by the earlier wrongful acts
and omissions of defendant's employees.
Inasmuch as the time of the act rule and last act of malpractice test
were founded not on statutory but on case law, 19 the Court of Appeals had the power to revise its own rules to accord with its current
understanding of the practicalities involved.
Nevertheless, an uneasy Borgiamajority felt obliged to legitimate
its reform by attempting to reconcile it with prior holdings. The
court stated that it "was making no rash or sudden break with precedent." 20 It noted, as had the trial court, a trend of decisions, in
14. N.Y. GEN. MUNiC. LAW § 50-e(1) (McKinney 1950).
15. 216 N.Y.S.2d 897 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1961).

16. 16 App. Div. 2d 927, 229 N.Y.&.2d 318 (2d Dept. 1962). Since its adoption in
New York in 1923, supra note 15, the continuous treatment rule had been refined to
mean that in an action to recover damages for malpractice involving a series of isolated negligent acts, the statute of limitations will begin to run upon the date of the
last act of malpractice. See cases cited in the brief for defendant in Borgia v. City of
New York, 12 N.Y.2d at 154.
17. 12 N.Y.2d at 155, 187 N.E2d at 778, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
18. Id. at 156, 187 NXE.2d at 779, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 321-2.

19. See note 53, infra.
20. 12 N.Y.2d at 156, 187 N.E2d at 778, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
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New York and other jurisdictions, which foreshadowed its holding 2 1
However, this trend did not justify the means.
The cases cited by the majority22 relied upon the legal theories

enunciated in Gillette v. Tucker. However, neither of the theories
used in Gillette to reconcile the continuous treatment rule with traditional time of the act concepts, were applicable in Borgia. There
was no continuous obligation, but rather, a series of isolated negligent acts. The damages had not accrued progressively, but, rather, the
"permanent damage had already been done."23
As the Borgia minority noted, the court could not afford "relief
without overturning the established distinctions between cases -involving a continuous course of improper treatment and those presenting merely an isolated act or acts." 24 There was no breach of a
continuing duty up until the discharge from the hospital; the defendant did not fail to remove a foreign object, nor did it misdiagnose the case, nor did it direct an improper course of treatment.
21. The majority cited five cases to support its proposition "that where there has
been continuing treatment time limitation does not start until treatment ends." Id.
at 156, 187 N.E2d at 778, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 321. However, in contradistinction to Borgia,
these cases involved continuing courses of improper treatment, and not a series of
isolated negligent acts.
In Schanil v. Branton, 181 Minn. 381, 232 N.W. 708 (1980), the defendants apparently improperly treated the plaintiff's leg injuries. It was the claim of the plaintiff "that defendants did not exercise reasonable care in the treatment of the fracture
while it was healing, particularly in that they failed to keep the leg stretched out
in proper alignment . . 2' (trial court's jury instructions, id. at 384, 232 N.W. at
710.) The opinion noted that the operation of the statute of limitations was controlled by Schmit v. Esser, 178 Minn. 82, 226 N.W. 196 (1929). Schmit acknowledged
that "if there be but a single act of malpractice subsequent time and effort merely
to remedy or cure that act could not toll the running of the statute." Id. at 84, 226
N.W. at 197. Thus, because the court affirmed the jury verdict for plaintiff, it can be
presumed that the defendants engaged in a continuous course of improper treatment.
De Haan v. Winter, 258 Mich. 293, 241 N.W. 928 (1982), involved the "[flailure to
give needed continued care and treatment, under opportunity and obligation to do
so .... " Id. at 296, 241 N.W. at 924. This court also cited Schrmit v. Esser, 183 Minn.
854, 236 N.W. 622 (1931), which was an appeal of an order overruling the physician's
demurrer to the complaint.
In Williams v. Elias, 140 Neb. 656, 1 N.W.2d 121 (1941), defendant misdiagnosed a
back injury and consequently failed to treat plaintiff's injuries. In Peteler v. Robinson, 81 Utah 535, 17 P.2d 244 (1932), there was an unnecessary tonsillectomy negligently performed. Sly v. Van Lengen, 120 Misc. 420, 198 N.Y.S. 608 (1923), involved
the failure to remove a surgically inserted foreign object.
Thus, each of these cases involves some improper course of treatment and each is
not analogous to the facts in Borgia.
22. Peteler v. Robinson cites Gillette at 81 Utah 547, 17 P.2d at 248. Williams v.
Elias cites Gillette at 140 Neb. 658, 1 N.W.2d at 122. Sly cites Gillette at 120 Misc.
421, 198 N.YS. at 609. Schmit v. Esser, heavily relied upon in both Schanil v. Branton
and De Haan v. Winter, cites Gillette at 178 Minn. 85, 226 NW. at 197,
23. 12 N.Y.2d at 160, 187 NEX.d at 781, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 325, (dissenting opinion of
Froessel, J).
24. Id. at 161, 187 N.E.2d at 781, 782, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 325.
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Needless clinging to the language and concepts of the old rules
created new difficulties. First, the court used plural nouns, "acts or
omissions," in both its statement of policy25 and its formulation of
the rule.26 Thus, in upholding the plaintiff's contention that "since
there were repeated acts of malpractice and negligence during the
course of treatment of the infant, the limitation period does not commence to run until the termination of treatment .... 1",,7 the plural
form in the opinion apparently requires multiple acts in order to
render the entire treatment improper. The treatment, thus deemed
improper, would give rise to a single cause of action, accruing at its
termination.
The policy considerations, which alone could justify the rule, do
not bespeak acts or omissions as necessary to the invocation of the
continuous treatment rule. A plaintiff who has been treated subsequent to a single negligent act might still have to interrupt the corrective efforts of his physician in order to commence his action before the statute of limitations had run.
Lower court cases after Borgia have resolved this apparent conflict
between language and policy in support of the latter. In Richmond
v. Capers,28 the Appellate Division held that "[tlhe defendant physician having treated the plaintiff wife for an injury allegedly caused
during surgery performed by him, a cause of action based on the
injury did not accrue until the termination of the treatment." 29 In
0 the plaintiff
O'Laughlin v. Salamanca Hospital DistrictAuthority,"
fell from her hospital bed because of defective restraints and lack
of attention. The hospital subsequently treated her for the injury
sustained in that fall. The court held that treatment subsequent to
that single incident of negligence was covered by the continuous
treatment rule and that her cause of action accrued upon discharge
from the hospital.
The language of the Borgia opinion has apparently created another problem. Use of the word "accrual" in quotation marks,81
another unnecessary attempt to link the new rule to old concepts,
25. "[Clare and treatment related to the conditions produced by the earlier wrongful acts and omissions of the defendant's employees." Id. at 156, 187 N.E.2d at 779,
237 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
26. "[A]t least when the course of treatment which included the wrongful acts or
omissions ....

"

Id. at 155, 187 NE.2d at 778, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 321.

27. Id. at 159, 187 N.Y.d at 780, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 323 (dissenting opinion).
28. 30 App. Div. 2d 976, 294 N.Y.S.2d 651 (2d Dept. 1968).
29. Id. at 976, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
30. 86 App. Div. 2d 51, 819 N.Y.S.2d 128 (4th Dept. 1971).
31. "Whether in the case of continuous treatment 'accrual' is postponed until treatment ends," and "the 'accrual' comes only at the end of treatment." 12 N.Y.2d at 155,
187 N.E2d at 778, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
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is evidence that the majority viewed the operation of the rule as
tolling the statute of limitations pending the end of continuous
treatment and did not intend a new definition of accrual. To state
this unequivocally, however, would be contrary to New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules [hereinafter CPLR] § 201 (McKinney 1972)
which mandates that no court extend the time permitted for the
commencement of an action. 32 Thus, the court could not toll the statute of limitations de jure, but could de facto achieve that result by
redefining when the cause of action accrues. The quotation marks
indicate its hesitancy to do this.
Unfortunately, a necessary corollary to redefining accrual as occurring "only at the end of treatment" is that a plaintiff cannot maintain his action until termination of the treatment. 3 Despite a patient's ability to prove that he has been treated negligently, and
consequently injured, a wronged patient cannot be allowed to sue
until the end of the physician-patient relationship; until then, his
cause of action has not accrued. It is only then that a plaintiff is first
entitled to maintain his action. 4 A plaintiff is allotted three years
after the end of treatment in which to commence his action. Allowing
him into court before the end of treatment would give him more
than three years, violating CPLR § 201 by extending the statutory
period.
Nevertheless, this has occurred and gone unnoticed. In OLaughlin,. 5 the plaintiff was required to serve a notice of claim as a condition precedent to the commencement of the action.36 Ms. O'Laughlin
filed her notice of claim on June 2, 1969 but was not discharged from
32. CPLR § 201 (McKinney 1962).
33. A 1950 HAv. L. Ray. Comment notes
that the courts have not always literally carried out the directive that the period begins when the cause of action accrues. The commencement of the statutory period has occasionally been delayed, despite the existence of a theoretical
right to recovery, until the occurrence of some later event the absence of which
made suit impossible or improbable: for example, until plaintiff learned of the
wrong or until substantial damage occurred.
Comment, Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1177,
1200 (1950). In Borgia the court carried out the literal directive that the period begins
when the cause of action accrues by expressly redefining accrual as occurring only at
the end of treatment. Thus there was no delay of the statutory period. However, no
theoretical right to recovery remained because the cause of action had not accrued
before the end of treatment.

34. Cases cited note 3 supra.
35. O'Laughlin v. Salamanca Hosp. Dist. Auth., 36 App. Div. 2d 51, 319 N.Y.S.2d
128 (4th Dept. 1971).
36. N.Y. PuB. Autr.
LAw § 1777(2) (McKinney 1970) provides that in an action
against the Salamanca Hospital District "founded upon a tort, a notice of claim shall
be required as a condition precedent to the commencement of an action ... and the
provisions of section fifty-e of the general municipal law shall govern the giving of
such notice ....
"
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the hospital until June 20, 1969. According to Borgia, the claim arises
only at the end of treatment. 7 If Ms. O'Laughlin's claim first arose
on June 20, she served notice of her claim before it existed. Her
action should have been dismissed. However, this issue was never
placed before or considered by the court.3 8
A third problem of the continuous treatment rule has been the
term "continuous treatment" itself. What does it include? What is
required? When does it end? A recent case has brought all these issues
to the fore. In Olsen v. County of Nassau,0 the plaintiff was admitted
to the defendant county hospital for treatment for severe injuries
sustained in an automobile crash. A radiologist negligently omitted
to take one X-ray view of the plaintiff's foot. A leg cast (to treat the
injuries to her femur) impeded discovery of the injury to her foot
for eight months of her ten month stay. After discharge, she returned
four times during the next six months for continued treatment of
the foot injury.40 Lower court decisions, after Borgia, have held that
treatment need not be on a daily basis but may consist of a series
of visits over an extended period of time41 as long as the treatment is
37. "[W]e note that the same rule must be applied whether we are passing on a
true Statute of Limitations problem ... or a section 50-e dispute. The question is the
same: when did the claim or cause of action 'accrue?" 12 N.Y.2d at 155, 187 NXE.2d at
778, 237 N.Y.S. at 320.
38. See also Wear v. State, 59 Misc. 2d 485, 299 N.Y.S.2d 469, modified and afl'd,
3 App. Div. 2d 886, 307 N.Y.S.2d 588 (4th Dept. 1969).
To avoid this situation, and to insure the high probability that a suit may be
brought before the statute of limitations period commences, courts in other jurisdictions have held that despite the continuation in treatment, the statutory period
will commence upon discovery.
For example, California adopted the continuous treatment rule in 1936 in Huysman
v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936). The court based its use of the rule upon
its belief that a physician-patient relationship tends to impede discovery of pertinent
facts. When a patient discovers the injury however, the rule is not needed. At the time
of the Huysman decision, the statute of limitations had been tolled pending discovery
in other causes of action and, therefore, precedent was available to the California
court to justify its holding that discovery prior to the end of continuous treatment
would activate the statute of limitations.
No such distinction was available to the Texas court in McFarland v. Connally,
252 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). At that time, neither a continuous treatment rule
nor a discovery rule was in effect. Nonetheless, the court stated that were it to adopt
the continuous treatment rule, it would not operate in a case of prior discovery. Texas
never did adopt a continuous treatment rule, Coffman v. Hedrick, 437 S.W.2d 60
(Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
39. Index No. 623/70 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County, Suozzi, J., June 1972).
40. N.B.: The Notice of Claim was filed on July 15, 1969, prior to the last three
visits.
41. Capuano v. Jacobs, 33 App. Div. 2d 743, 805 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1st Dept. 1969), a/I'd,
27 N.Y.2d 776, 264 N.E.2d 848, 315 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1970); Gross v. Wise, 18 App. Div. 2d
1097, 289 N.Y.S.2d 954 (2d Dept. 1963); Armstrong v. City of New York, 39 Misc. 2d 445,
240 N.Y.S.2d 663 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1963); Wear v. State, 59 Misc. 2d 485, 299
N.Y.S.2d 469 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1968), modified, 38 App. Div. 2d 886, 307 N.Y.S.2d 588 (4th
Dept. 1969).
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related to the same original condition or complaint which gave rise
to the cause of action.42 Did the hospital's care during each of Mrs.
Olsen's five visits therefore constitute continuous treatment? According to the court, it did not.
Another factor in this case was that the plaintiff was first admitted
to the defendant hospital as a public patient. The hospital was responsible for the direction and control of her course of treatment.
At about the time the foot injury was discovered, Mrs. Olsen engaged
a staff physician as her private doctor. That physician was required,
by hospital procedures, to get the express permission of the hospital
in order to assume control of the treatment. This was done. The
hospital abandoned the case and a new private physician-patient
relationship was created. For the two months after this change in
relationships, the hospital provided merely ministerial services. Continuity of the professional relationship is essential to the application
of the continuous treatment rule.43 Did this change in relationships
mark the end of the defendant's continuous treatment? According
to the court, it did not.
When continuous treatment ends is a question of fact. 44 Nevertheless, the judge did not submit the issue to the jury. Rather, he
decided that the hospital's continuous treatment ended upon the
plaintiff's discharge after her original ten-month stay. Admittedly,
this was by far her longest sojourn, but its length is no justification
for terming its end the end of treatment.
The goal of the continuous treatment rule has been to give the
patient more time to discover his cause of action. However, the rule
has proved awkward in theory and difficult in practice. Reform is
invited. Many of the problems with the continuous treatment rule
could be eliminated by the adoption of a universal discovery rule in
which the cause of action accrues upon discovery. This would re42. Schwenn v. Cacho, 35 App. Div. 2d 851, 317 N.Y.s.2d 234 (2d Dept. 1970); Gnoj
v. City of New York, 29 App. Div. 2d 404, 288 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1st Dept. 1968); Stern v.
Hausberg, 22 App. Div. 2d 669, 258 N.Y.S.2d 447 (1st Dept. 1964).
43. McQuinn v. St. Lawrence County Laboratory, 28 App. Div. 2d 1035, 285 N.Y.S.2d
747 (3rd Dept. 1967), appeal denied, 21 N.Y.2d 644, 285 N.E.2d 927, 288 N.Y.S.2d 1027
(1968). In Borgia, the court noted that "[t]he continuous treatment we mean is treatment for the same or related illnesses or injuries, continuing after the alleged act of
malpractice, not mere continuity of the general physician-patient relationship." 12
N.Y.2d at 157, 187 N.E2d at 779, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 822. See also Gilbert Properties, Inc.
v. Milistein, (App. Div., 1st Dept. Nov. 28, 1972) 168 N.Y.L.J. 105 at 1, col. 3, Dec. 4,
1972 (attorney malpractice).
44. Wear v. State of New York, 33 App. Div. 886, 807 N.Y.S.2d 588 (4th Dept. 1969);
Gnoj v. City of New York, 29 App. Div. 404, 288 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1st Dept. 1968); Hall
v. Weinstein (Sup. Ct. Kings County, Feb. 22, 1972) 167 N.Y.L.J. 86 at 19, col. 1, Feb. 23,
1972, citing Capuano v. Jacobs, 33 App. Div. 2d 743, 804 N.Y.S.2d 837 (lst Dept. 1969).
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quire a clear break from traditional concepts. just that was attempted
in the 1969 addition of a discovery rule in foreign object medical
malpractice.

III.

TnE FOREIGN OBJECr DIscoVERY RULE

The Court of Appeals' behavior in adopting the foreign object
discovery rule affords a refreshing contrast to its previous behavior in
embracing the continuous treatment rule. Instead of strained attempts to justify the new rule by means of old precedent, the court
broke with the past to produce the new rule in Flanaganv. Mount
Eden General Hospital:45 "[W]here a foreign object has been negligently left in the patient's body, the statute of limitations will not
begin to run until the patient could have reasonably discovered the
malpractice." 4
Despite the court's frank departure from the past and its clear
statement of the new rule, at least three legal problems were created
by the Flanagan holding. First, New York's continual rejection of
proposed discovery rule legislation lends support to the dissent's argument that the court was required to continue to hold that time of
discovery was irrelevant to when a cause of action accrued. Second,
CPLR § 203(f) makes it clear that a cause of action cannot accrue
upon discovery. This was a barrier apparently unnoticed by the
court. Third, the restricted application of the new rule to foreign
object malpractice was unwarranted and unsupportable. Fortunately,
lower court decisions, either in defiance or ignorance, have so manipulated the foreign object restriction as to practically abandon it.
In Flanagan, the plaintiff underwent surgery for a gall bladder
ailment. Clamps had been inserted during the surgical procedures
but never removed. Eight years later, upon experiencing severe abdominal pain, she discovered the clamps. Clearly, if the plaintiff's
cause of action accrued at the time of the negligent act, the statute
of limitations had already run. The court found the result untenable, placing "'an undue strain upon common sense, reality, logic,
and simple justice.'

",7

The dissenting judge in Flanagan provided a "sketchy" history
of legislative action to demonstrate the Legislature's repeated resistance to the adoption of a discovery rule.48 In 1942 and 1962 the
45. 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969).
46. Id. at 431, 248 N.E.2d at 873, 801 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
47. Morgan v. Grace Hosp. Inc., 149 W. Va. 783, 792, 144 S.E.2d 156, 161 as cited in
24 N.Y.2d at 431, 248 N.E.2d at 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
48. 24 N.Y.2d at 439, 440, 248 N.E.2d at 877, 878, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 33, 34.
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Law Revision Commission had proposed discovery legislation which
was not passed. 49 A 1968 bill was passed by the Assembly, but not
reported out of Senate committee.5" The only positive response of
the Legislature was to change the old two-year statutory period to
three years in 1962. 51 Consequently, Judge Breitel concluded that: 52
the only ground on which the courts, at this time, could purport to overrule or avoid the statute and its impact must be to
exercise some super-legislative power of statutory revision. To
characterize such a change of the law as merely interpretation
or reinterpretation of a statute, in light of its judicial and legislative history, is disingenuous.
Judge Keating, speaking for the majority, believed that the
court's decision
[did] not encroach upon any legislative prerogatives. The Legislature did not provide that the Statute of Limitations should
run from the time of the medical malpractice. This court did.
Therefore, a determination that the time of accrual is the
time of discovery is no more judicial legislation than was the
original determination [emphasis added]. Granted, the Legislature could have acted to change our rule; however, we
would surrender our own function if we were to refuse to deliberate upon unsatisfactory court-made rules simply because
a period of time has elapsed and the Legislature has not seen
53
fit to act.
Certainly, Judge Breitel's objection cannot be summarily dismissed.
Further, neither the majority nor the dissent considered the im49. An action to recover damages for malpractice. The cause of action in such
a case is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the injured person of
the facts constituting the malpractice, but this provision shall not permit commencement of such an action after six years from the occurrence of such malpractice ...
1942 N.Y. EaG.Doc. No. 65, REPORT OF TnE LAW REVISION COMMSSION 135.
[A] cause of action for malpractice is deemed to have accrued upon the discovery
by the plaintiff or the person under whom he claims of the facts constituting the
malpractice, but this provision shall not permit commencement of such an action

after six years from the occurrence of the malpractice...
1962 N.Y. LG. Doc. No. 65, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION 229.
50. 1968 N.Y. LEG. IEcoD 8: INDEx, at A.64, A16.
51. CPLR § 214, subd. 6, formerly Civ. Prac. Act § 50 subd. 1 (repealed 1963). See
1 WEINSTEIN, KoaN & MuLER, N.Y. Cm PAcrIcE
211.21.
52. 24 N.Y.2d at 440, 248 N.E.2d at 879, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 34.

53. Id. at 434, 248 N.E.2d at 875, 301 NY.S.2d at 29.
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pact of GPLR § 203(f) although it is the strongest argument against
the court's new rule. Section 203(f) provides
where the time within which an action must be commenced
is computed from the time when the facts were discovered or
from the time when facts could with reasonable diligence have
been discovered, or from either of such times, the action must
be commenced within two years after such actual or imputed
discovery or within the period otherwise provided, computed

from the time the cause of action accrued, whichever is
longer.54
The reasoning of this argument is as follows:
1. § 203(f) provides that the statute of limitations shall be 2 years
from discovery or X years from the accrual of the cause of action,
depending on the period specified in the applicable statute of limitations. In malpractice actions, X would be 3 years.
2. The purpose of 203(f) was to shorten the statutory period to
2 years in actions in which the facts were discovered long after the
occurrence giving rise to the action.
3. The Flanagan court held that the cause of action accrued
upon discovery. This was the only way in which the court could
have adopted the discovery rule because it was prevented from extending the statute of limitations by CPLR § 201.
4. When 203(f) is applied to malpractice cases in which the

cause of action accrues upon discovery, the result is a statute of limitations which shall be 2 years from discovery or 3 years from discovery whichever is longer.
5. This result is absurd and defeats the purpose of 203(f).

6. § 203(f), therefore, cannot be applied to cases in which the
cause of action accrues upon discovery.
7. But, 203(f) on its face and according to its stated purpose ap-

plies to all cases in which the statute of limitations is computed from
discovery.
8. Therefore, the Court of Appeals could not have and should
not have adopted a discovery rule.
A discussion of each proposition follows:
1. Section 203(f) provides a simple formula: the statute of limi-

tations shall be the, later of (a) two years from discovery or (b) the
period otherwise provided. The period otherwise provided is to be
computed from the time "the cause of action accrued."55 For example:
54. CPLR § 203(0.
55. 1 WEINsrEiN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 51,
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In a fraud case, if the defendant commits the fraud in 1960,
and the plaintiff discovers the fraud in 1961, the statute of
limitations would expire in 1966 (six years from commission).
If the plaintiff discovered the wrong in 1962, 1963, or 1964
the result would be the same. If, however, the wrong is discovered in 1965, then the statute of limitations would expire
in 1967 (two years from discovery). Any discovery after 1965
would trigger the two-year provision. It can be seen therefore,
that, the statute of limitations in a fraud action is two years
from discovery, but, in no event, is it less than six years from
commission. 6
2. Section 203(f) is designed "to shorten the period of limitations
in those cases where discovery of the wrong occurs long after its commission." 7 "The philosophy behind this statute is simple: A plaintiff... who discovers the cause of action long after it has accrued,
should not have the same length of time in which to sue as a plaintiff who discovers his cause of action promptly."' 8
The statute of limitations has traditionally been considered a
"device for repose."59 With the adoption of a discovery rule, however, there will never come a time when a defendant can be "'secure
in his reasonable expectation that the slate has been wiped clean of
ancient obligations.' "60 To a certain extent, § 203(f) was intended
to balance the interests of a plaintiff who has not discovered his cause
of action and a defendant who wishes to "clean his slate" as soon as
possible. While no outside limit is placed (a plaintiff will never be
barred from court because he did not discover his cause of action
within a certain period of time), § 203(f) requires him to commence
his action within a shorter period of time than if he had discovered
his cause of action promptly.
3. § 203(a) of the CPLR states that "[It]he time within which an
action must be commenced.., shall be computed from the time the
cause of action accrued .... " 61 § 201 states that "[n]o court shall ex56. McLaughlin, PRAcrcE COMMENTARY CPLR § 203(f) at 125 cited in McCabe v.
Gelfand, 57 Misc. 2d 12, 15, 291 N.Y.S.2d 261, 264 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1968),
vacated, 58 Misc. 2d 497, 295 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1968). See also 1
203.35.
WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 51,

57. 1965 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 90, 10 REPORT OF TnE

JUDIcIAL CONF. 96,

104.

58. McLaughlin, supra note 56. N.B.: Dean McLaughlin seems to be of the

opinion that the foreign object discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations pending
discovery, the cause of action still accruing at the time of the act. See also note 67 infra.
59. Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 218, 237 N.Y.S.2d
714, 718, 188 N.E.2d 142, 145, as cited in Flanagan, 24 N.Y.2d at 440, 301 N.Y.S.2d at
35, 248 N.E.2d at 879.
60. Comment, supra note 33, at 1177, 1185, as cited in Flanagan, 24 N.Y.2d at 429,

248 N.E2d at 872, 801 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
61. CPLR § 203(a).
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tend the time limited by law for the commencement of an action. 0' 2
Therefore, a court must consider the statute of limitations as running upon the accrual of the cause of action and may not postpone,
toll, or extend its operation. Hence, for a court to adopt a discovery
rule without violating § 201 it must hold that the cause of action
accrued upon discovery. This is exactly what the Flanagancourt did:
08
"the time of accrual is the time of discovery."
4. & 5. Dean McLaughlin, in an annual report of the Judicial
Conference, recognized the absurdity of applying § 203(f) to cases in
which the "cause of action 'shall not be deemed to have accrued' until discovery." It cannot be applied "for the obvious reason that the
first 'segment
of the alternate formula presently runs from discovt
ery. Yf

If, for example, it were not to be provided that a cause of action for fraud shall not be deemed to have accrued until discovery, the application of the alternate formula of CPLR 203
(f) would lead to the following absurd conclusion: the statute
of limitations shall be six years from discovery or two years
from discovery, whichever is longerl 5
Similarly, if the malpractice cause of action accrues upon discovery, the application of 203(f) would lead to the conclusion that
the statute of limitations shall be three years from discovery or two
years from discovery, whichever is longer. As the three-year period

will always terminate one year later than the two-year period, the
purpose of § 203(f), to shorten the statute of limitations, would be
totally frustrated.
6. Therefore, if § 203(f) is to be at all effective, it cannot be applied to cases in which the cause of action accrues upon discovery.
7. Yet, § 203(f) applies, on its face, to cases "where the time
within which an action must be commenced is computed from the
time the facts were discovered." 60 The language and legislative history of the statute indicates that it was meant to and does apply to
all causes of action in which a discovery rule is applied.
The policy considerations behind 208(f) are as valid when applied to malpractice actions as any other types of action. Neither
the statute itself, nor its legislative history, indicates an intended
62. CPLR § 201.
63. 24 N.Y.2d at 434, 248 NE.2d at 875, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
64. 1965 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 90, supra note 57 at 106.
65. Id. to the same effect, see 1 WEmsrmN, KoP.N & MAiLr.am,

203.35 (1972).

66. CPLR § 203(f (McKinney 1972).
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nonapplicability to malpractice. In fact, its applicability to malprac67
tice has been assumed. As Dean McLaughlin pointed out:
Since section 203(f) appears to be of general applicability,
there is no reason why it should not serve as a further limitation upon the new malpractice rule, so that, in foreign object
cases, the statute of limitations will henceforth be three years
from the commission of the malpractice or two years from discovery (actual or constructive), whichever is longer.
8. The court knew that it was clearly not empowered to adopt
a rule extending the statute of limitations. It apparently did not
know that it was similarly barred from adopting a rule stating that
a malpractice action accrues upon discovery. And so it blindly did
The court's restriction of the operation of the discovery rule to
foreign object medical malpractice raises other problems. The majority noted a "fundamental difference," for the purpose of the statute of limitations, between foreign object and other types of
malpractice actions. In the former, "no claim can be made that the
patient's action may be feigned or frivolous. In addition, there is no
possible causal break between the negligence of the doctor or the
hospital and the patient's injury."68
These evidentiary considerations alone cannot justify the restriction. From a plaintiff patient's view, there is little difference between
foreign object malpractice and any other sort; neither does the type
of malpractice change the defendant's situation. The discovery rule
should, therefore, have been applied by the court to all such actions.
Luckily, subsequent cases have so distorted the foreign object restriction as to practically abandon it. While lower court decisions,
which approach a universal discovery rule, may be theoretically more
logical, they clearly do not follow the mandates of the Court of Ap6 9 the rule was applied to
peals. In Murphy v. St. Charles Hospital,
67. M cLaughlin, New York Practice,21 S. 1._
.709, 716 (1970). McLaughlin's
misconception that the Flanagan decision had tolled the statute of limitations pending
discovery is evidenced by his statement that: "Probably because it was unnecessary to
the decision, the majority opinion in Flanagan contains no reference to CPIR Section
203(f) which provides an alternate formula of two years from discovery in cases where
the statute of limitations is tolled pending discovery of the wrong." His apparent
misunderstanding did not diminish his knowledge of the legislative intent of the
section. The language of the statute itself does not reveal an intent to limit application
to cases where the statute of limitations is tolled pending discovery, but rather the
statute is to apply to all cases in which the statute of limitations is computed from
discovery. However, the result is that one can compute from discovery only when
the statutory period is tolled.
68. 24 N.Y.2d at 480, 248 N.E.2d at 872, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
69. 35 App. Div. 2d 64, 312 N.Y.S.2d 978 (2d Dept. 1970).
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a situation in which the plaintiff was injured when a prosthetic device broke. In spite of the evidentiary similarities, i.e., the presence
of an injury-producing object within the body, the application of
the foreign discovery rule to this case is contrary to the guidelines of
Flanagan. There was no object "negligently left in the patient's
body." Further, there was a question of causation: what caused the
prosthesis to break? The Flanagan restriction avoided this issue by
limiting the application of the discovery rule to cases in which a
foreign object was negligently left within a patient.
The Appellate Division, in Dobbins v. Clifford,70 entirely ignored these distinctions and applied the foreign object rule to a
case in which no object was involved at all. The plaintiff, four years
after his operation, discovered severe damage to his pancreas. The
court decided that the case fell within the Flanagan guidelines because "an act of malpractice [had been] committed internally so that
discovery [was] difficult; real evidence of the malpractice in the form
of the hospital record is available... ; professional diagnostic judgment is not involved, and there is no danger of false claims." 71
In Murphy there was a more plausible theory upon which to
grant the plaintiff relief from the statutory bar; 72 in Dobbins there
was not. Neither excuses the improper, if not capricious, manipulation of Flanagan.These decisions, however, show that the Flanagan
restriction is too confining. The holdings in these cases are more in
accord with the realities of medical malpractice and more sympathetic to the difficulties a patient has in discovering that he has a
cause of action.
IV. CONCLUSION
The New York law surrounding statutes of limitation is in a state
of conflict and confusion. The continuous treatment rule needs
case-by-case redefinition. The foreign object discovery rule is at odds
with the GPLR and lower courts are unwilling to abide by its boundaries.
By now 24 jurisdictions have a general discovery rule.7 8 Only
70. 39 App. Div. 2d 1, 330 N.Y.S.2d 743 (4th Dept. 1972).
71. Id. at 4, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 746.

72. In Murphy the court noted that the plaintiff's action is timely for reasons
apart from the Flanagan case..... ifihe plaintiff's cause of action could not have
accrued before the prosthesis broke because a necessary element of the cause
of action-injury--had not yet occurred. . . . [I]t is only where the negligent
act creates damage or injury, that a cause of action comes into being (citation).
35 App. Div. 2d at 67, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
73. AL.

CODE tit. 7, § 25(l) (1960), 2 yrs. from act or 6 mos. from discovery, but
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16 operate under the time of the act rule.74 Five more apply a
not more than 6 yrs. from act; ARiz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 12-542B (Supp.
1972), 6 yrs. from
injury or 2 yrs. from discovery, whichever is earlier; CAL. Civ. PRo.
CODE § 340.5 (Supp.
1972), 4 yrs. from injury or 1 yr. from discovery; COLO. R-v. STAT.
ANN. § 87-1-6 (1964),
2 yrs. from discovery but not more than 6 yrs. from the act except
in foreign object
cases; CONN. GN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (Supp. 1972), 2 yrs. from
discovery but not more
than 3 yrs. from act; D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-301 (1967), 3 yrs. from
injury, see Jones v.
Rogers Mem. Hosp., 442 F.2d 778, 143 U.S. App. D.C. 51 (1971);
FLA. STAT. § 95-11(6)
(Supp. 1972), 2 yrs. from discovery; HA vAI Rxv. STAT. § 657-7 (1957),
2 yrs. from accrual
of cause of action, see Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hosp., 50 Haw. 150, 483
P.2d 220 (1967); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 83, §§ 15, 22.1 (Smith-Hurd 1966), 2 yrs. from accrual
of cause of action,
but from discovery with 10 yr. limit in foreign object cases.
See Lipsey v. Michael
Reese Hosp., 46 IIl. 2d 82, 262 NX.2d 450 (1970); IowA CODE
ANN. § 614.1(2) (Supp.
1969), 2 yrs. from accrual of cause of action, see Chrischilles v. Griswvold,
260 Iowa 453,
150 N.W.2d 94 (1967); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513 (Supp. 1971), 2
yrs. from substantial or
reasonably ascertainable injury but not more than 10 yrs. from
act; Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 413.140 (Supp. 1972), 1 yr. from discovery, but not
more than 5 yrs. from
injury; L . Civ. CODE ANN. art. 3536 (West 1953), 1 yr., see Springer
v. Aetna Casualty
and Surety Co., 169 So. 2d 171 (La. App. 1964); AID. ANN. CODE
art. 57, § 1 (1972 Repl.
Vol.), 8 yrs. from accrual of cause of action, see Leonhart v. Atkinson,
265 Md. 219,
289 A.2d 1 (1972), explaining Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241
Md. 137, 215 A.2d 825
(1966); MorNT. Rv. CoDEs ANN. § 93-2624 (Supp. 1971), 3 yrs. from
injury or discovery
but not more than 5 yrs. from injury; NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-208
(1964), 2 yrs. from
accrual of cause of action, see Acker v. Sorensen, 183 Neb. 866,
165 N.W.2d 74 (1969);
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (1952), 2 yrs. from accrual of cause
of action, see Lopez v.
Swyer, 115 N.J. Super. 237, 279 A.2d 116 (1971); N.D. CErT. CODE
§ 28-01-18(8) (Supp.
1971), 2 yrs. from accrual of cause of action, see Iverson v.
Lancaster, 158 N.W.2d
507 (1968); Or..A. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95(8d) (Supp. 1972), 2 yrs.
from accrual of cause
of action, see Lewis v. Owen, 395 F.2d 587 (10th Cir. 1968); ORE.
RIv. STAT. § 12.110(4)
(1971), 2 yrs. from discovery but not more than 5 yrs. from treatment,
operation, etc.,
upon which the action is based; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 84 (1958),
2 yrs. from injury,
see Schaffer v. Larzilere, 410 Pa. 402, 189 A-2d 267 (1963);
GEN. IAwS ANN.
§ 9-1-14 (Supp. 1972), 8 yrs. from accrual of cause of action, see Ri.
Wilkinson v. Harring.
ton, 104 R.I. 224, 243 A.2d 745 (1968); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §
4.16 (Supp. 1971), 3 yrs.
from act or 1 yr. from discovery, whichever is later; W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-2-12(b)
(1966), 2 yrs. from accrual of right of action, see Bishop v. Byrne,
265 F. Supp. 460
(S.D.W. Va. 1967), explaining Morgan v. Grace Hosp. Inc., 140
W. Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d
156 (1965).
74. ALAsKA STAT. § 09.10.070 (1962), 2 yrs. from accrual of cause
of action; ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 37-205 (1962 Repl.), 2 yrs. from act, see Crossett Health
Center v. Croswell,
221 Ark. 874, 256 S.W.2d 548 (1958); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
14, § 758 (1964), 2 yrs.
from accrual of cause of action, see Tantish v. Szendry, 158 Me.
228, 182 A.2d 660
(1962); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 260, § 4 (Supp. 1972), 8 yrs.
from accrual of cause
of action, see Pasquale v. Chandler, 850 Mass. 450, 215 N.E.2d
819 (1966); Mss. CODE
ANN. § 15-1-49 (1972), 6 yrs. from accrual of cause of action, see
Wilder v. St. Joseph's
Hosp., 225 Miss. 42, 82 So. 2d 651 (1955); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.140
(1952), 2 yrs. from
act, see Keaton v. Crayton, 326 F. Supp. 1155 (W.D. Mo. 1969); NEv.
REv. STAT. ch. 11.190
(4e) (1967), 2 yrs. from accrual of cause of action; N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 508:4 (1972),
6 yrs, from accrual of cause of action, see Cloutier v. Kasheta, 105
N.H. 262, 197 A.2d
627 (1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 23-1-8 (1954), 3 yrs. from accrual
of cause of action, see
Roybal v. White, 72 N.M. 285, 883 P.2d 250 (1968); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-52(5) (Supp.
1971), 3 yrs. from accrual of cause of action, see Shearin v. Lloyd,
246 N.C. 863, 98
S.E.2d 508 (1957); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-148(5) (1962), 6 yrs. from
accrual of cause of
action, cf. Brown v. Finger, 240 S.C. 102, 124 S.E.2d 781 (1962);
S.D. Coup. LAws ANN.
§ 15-2-15(3) (1967), 2 yrs. from accrual of cause of action, cf.
Hinkle v. Hargens, 76
S.D. 820, 81 N.W.2d 888 (1957); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-304 (Supp.
1971), 1 yr. from
accrual of the cause of action, see Clinard v. Pennington, 438 S.W.2d
748 (Tenn. App.
1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 512 (Supp. 1972), 3 yrs. from accrual
of cause of action,
see Murray v. Allen, 103 Vt. 378, 154 A. 678 (1931); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8-24 (1957 Repl.),
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continuous treatment rule75 and five a foreign object discovery rule."6
Were New York to add itself to the 24, most of the present practical and theoretical problems would disappear. To accomplish this
end, legislation is needed. Enactment of a universal discovery rule
is long overdue. If the legislature fails to act, the Court of Appeals,
taking the bull by the horns, should apply its illegitimate discovery
rule to all malpractice cases.
2 yrs. from accrual of right to bring action, see Hawks v. Dehart, 206 Va. 810, 146
S.E.2d 187 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.205 (1966), 3 yrs., see McCluskey v. Thranow,
31 Wis. 2d 245, 142 N.W.2d 787 (1966).
75. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-627 (1967 Repl.), 2 yrs. from act, see Ostojic v. Brueckmann,
405 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1968); MIcH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 600.5838 (1968), 2 yrs., "A
claim . .. accrues at the time that person discontinues treating or otherwise serving
plaintiff in a professional or pseudo-professional capacity as to the matters out of
which the claim for malpractice arose."; MNN. STAT. ANN. § 541.01 (1969), 2 yrs. from
accrual of the cause of action, see Johnson v. Winthrop Laboratories, 190 N.W.2d 77
(Minn. 1971); Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 2305.11 (1954), 1 yr. from accrual of cause of
action, see Wyler v. Tripi, 20 Ohio St. 2d 164, 267 N.E2d 419 (1971); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-19 (1959), 1 yr. (borrowing Ohio case law).
76. DE.L. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8118 (Supp. 1970), 2 yrs. from injury, see Layton v.
Allen, 246 A.2d 794 (Del. 1968); GA. CODE § 3-1004 (Supp. 1971), 2 yrs. from accrual of
right of action, see Parker v. Vaughn, 124 Ga. App. 300, 183 S.E.2d 605 (1971); IDAHO
CODE § 5-219(4) (Supp. 1971), 2 yrs. from act or 1 yr. from discovery in foreign object
cases; TEx. R v. Civ. STAT. art. 5526 (1958), 2 yrs. from accrual of cause of action, see
Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 ('rex. 1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.2 (1953),
4 yrs. from accrual of cause of action, see Christiansen v. Rees, 20 Utah 2d 199, 436 P.2d
435 (1968).
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